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Abstract 
There is little known about the effects of staggered-hours programs that affect workers’ 
working schedules to mitigate peak congestion. We examine the effect of workers’ morning 
start times on their wages for Germany. In contrast to previous work based on cross-section 
data, we demonstrate that wages are not, or maybe, a slight inverse U-shaped function of start 
time suggesting that staggered-hours programs might be welfare enhancing.  
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1.0 Introduction 
Traditionally, most of the labour supply has been structured following a set worktime pattern 
under which all workers start and end work at the same time. Henderson (1981) reports that, 
in 1979, 75 per cent of workers arrive within a time interval of 15 minutes. This situation 
causes a large volume of traffic around work start and end times. One way to mitigate the 
lengthening of the commute time due to peak congestion has been by diversifying start 
times.1 Nevertheless, heavy morning and evening peak congestion (for example, Arnott et al., 
1993) are still a major worry not only for policymakers, but also for employers as it increases 
the travel costs of workers to arrive at work.  
Commute time induced by traffic congestion is directly related to the workers’ 
distribution of start (and therefore end) times (Vickrey, 1969; Henderson, 1974; Chu, 1995; 
Fosgerau, 2008). When workers’ start times spread out, peak congestion is flattened. The 
present paper examines workers’ compensation through variation in wages related to spread 
in morning start times, allowing us to get more insight about the effects of mandatory 
staggered-hours programs, which induce firms, and therefore workers, to vary the time 
workers arrive at and leave from the workplace.2 The number of firms adopting staggered 
work hours has been increasing in recent years in many countries (see, for example, Mun and 
Yonekawa, 2006). In Germany, which is the focus of our analysis, staggered work hours are a 
matter of great interest and have become widespread, utilised by one out of three firms 
(Bauer et al., 2007). Arnott (2007) argues that it is a priori not clear that the government’s 
intervening to internalize only the negative externalities of congestion would be welfare-
enhancing. It is therefore key to understand the effect of mandatory staggered-hours 
                                               
1
 Other ways to diversify work schedules include a compressed week work, where a worker works her usual 
number of hours over a fewer number of workdays, or flextime, where a worker has some choice in establishing 
her work schedule. 
2
 A small number of dominant (extremely large) employers may voluntarily internalize the external costs of 
commuting by staggering work hours (see, for example, Safavian and McLean, 1975; Giuliano and Golob, 
1990).  
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programs on welfare. By focusing on the effect of start times on wages, we are able to see 
whether these programs affect productivity and workers’ disutility. 
The large empirical labour economics literature focusing on the effect of job attributes 
on wages, known as hedonic wage theory, has largely ignored workers’ start time. See Cahuc 
and Zylberberg (2004) for an exposition of hedonic wages theory. In the urban transportation 
literature, the relationship between workers’ departure time, travel time and work start time 
has received much attention (for example, Small, 1982; Arnott et al., 1993). This relationship 
has become more relevant with the increasing popularity of flexible work-hours (Yoshimura 
and Okumura, 2001; Li, 2007). However, this literature ignores compensation in the labour 
market for the chosen start time by taking the wage as given (an exception is Wilson, 1989). 
Furthermore, the bulk of transport literature generally takes the start-time of the job as given. 
The urban transport literature focuses on travel time valuation and activity-scheduling 
behaviour. In this literature, the start-time of the job is a key variable of interest and assumed 
to be (endogenously) determined by (endogenous) activity preferences and (exogenous) 
employer restrictions. This paper aims to reduce the existing divergence between labour and 
transport economics literature by using the insights about start time of the job (importance), 
as studied in detail in the transport literature, and apply them into the field of labour 
economics.  
The relationship between wages and start times is the result of the effect of start time on 
workers’ preferences and productivity (assuming a constant workday, so workers’ schedule is 
fully described by start time, see Wilson, 1989). With preferences, we refer to the worker’s 
utility derived from start time which may involve scheduling preferences for the timing of 
leisure activities (for example, family responsibilities – to have breakfast together – or 
socializing with friends after work; see Mahmassani and Chang, 1990; Wang, 1996)) and 
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commuting time preferences, as there is a strong relationship between start time and time 
length of the commute due to congestion (see Chu, 1995; Wang, 1996).  
Commuting time costs are always higher at peak congestion, but a priori, it is not clear 
how scheduling preferences relate to peak congestion.3 Some workers may prefer to start 
working before the peak, whereas others may prefer to start after the peak.4 It is, however, 
plausible that most workers prefer to synchronize leisure activities with others, and therefore 
synchronize work times (Bernheim, 1994). This is consistent with the study of Emmerink and 
van Beek (1997) where respondents report that they travel at peak times, and not at non-peak 
times, (mainly) due to their own scheduling preferences, and not due to constraints set by 
employers. So, workers’ scheduling preferences likely cause peak congestion. 
Worker’s productivity may also depend on the worker’s start time (Golembiewski et 
al., 1974; Shepard et al., 1996). It is usually assumed that workers’ productivity increases 
with the number of workers that are active at a certain time within a firm or even within the 
economy (Henderson, 1981; Arnott, 2007). For example, workers that start on different times 
may reduce opportunities for scheduling meetings, workers interaction and inhibits 
responsiveness to clients (Weiss, 1996). Examples of jobs for which this may be relevant are 
classroom teaching, police and fire services and emergency-medical services. If productivity 
depends on the number of workers outside the firm, then this implies the existence of an 
externality (Mills, 1967; Brainard, 1997). So, start times will be concentrated during the day 
and wages will be higher at peak times. Another reason that worker’s productivity may 
depend on start time is due to diminishing marginal returns of labour when capital costs are 
fixed, see Lucas (1970). Examples of such jobs include assembly-line manufacturing. If 
workers prefer to start working at peak hours, the number of workers hired will then be lower 
                                               
3
 Work start time has been traditionally set by external factors such as daylight and temperature, which may 
affect current preferences (Weiss, 1996). 
4
 The relationship between scheduling preferences and peak congestion is much clearer though given the 
assumption of identical preferences. 
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outside peak hours, so wages outside peak hours will then be higher (such that wage equals 
marginal productivity).  
So, in a competitive labour market, a variety of start times may be offered to workers at 
different wages reflecting preferences and productivity of workers varying by work start time 
and an equilibrium locus of wages and start times exists (see Henderson, 1981). We aim to 
estimate this equilibrium locus. In equilibrium in a competitive market, by assumption, 
workers maximize their utility and firms maximize profits, and wages equal marginal 
productivity. We focus now on two possible (stereotype) equilibria that may arise. In the first 
equilibrium, wages are a U-shaped function of start time, and wages obtain a minimum at 
peak time. In this case, workers prefer to start at peak time but accept jobs outside the peak 
because they are compensated by higher wages (so, the worker’s productivity is increased 
enough to compensate for inconvenient start times). In the second equilibrium, wages are an 
inverse U-shaped function of start time. Thus, workers prefer to work at non-peak times (for 
example, because of large savings in commuting time), and demand higher wages at peak 
times (so, workers must be more productive at peak times, for instance due to the nature of 
their job, as otherwise employers are not willing to pay a higher wage).  
The only empirical study of wages and start time we are aware of reports that the 
relationship between wages and start time is strongly inverse U-shaped Wilson (1988). So, 
workers starting at a peak time are paid much more than those starting later or earlier. 
However, this interpretation is controversial, because the study does not control sufficiently 
for worker characteristics (for example, the study does not control for weekly hours which is 
important, at least theoretically, see Kinoshita, 1987) and relies on cross-section data. As 
argued by Arnott (2007, p.190): “Wilson found that … the daily average wage is on average 
twice as high for workers with a peak work start-time … than for those with an off-peak work 
start-time. Intuition suggests that this difference is too large to be explained by intra-day 
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productivity effects alone, and that sorting of workers across start times, on the basis of 
ability attributes observable to employers but not to the empirical researcher, must play an 
important role too. No empirical work has been done that attempts to distinguish between the 
two effects”.  
One contribution of the present paper is that we use panel data and control for many 
worker characteristics and unobserved time-invariant worker characteristics using a workers’ 
fixed-effects methodology. So we are able to examine the effect of changes in start time on 
wages which are induced by hypothetical policies that encourage off-peak start times to 
mitigate traffic congestion (see, for example, Giuliano and Golob, 1990; Arnott et al., 2005). 
The first-best policy to reduce peak congestion is by road pricing, which may be infeasible in 
practice. As a second-best policy, governments may induce firms to stagger work hours.  
The outline of the paper is as follows: in Section 2 we provide information on data 
employed, introduce the econometric model of wages and present empirical results; Section 3 
concludes. 
 
2.0 Worker Compensation Analysis for Start Time 
2.1 The data 
Our study is based on information from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) survey 
for the years 2004, 2006 and 2008.5 Our dataset contains 14,108 annual observations for 
8,364 workers of which 7,355 are observed in two years and 6,524 in three years. The sample 
is restricted to workers aged 20-60, who (usually) work at least 10 hours per week and 
between 4 to 12 hours per day. 
A work schedule is either flexible or fixed (when it does not change from day to day). 
When it is fixed, which applies to the large majority (77 per cent), then we know the start 
                                               
5
 For details of these data, see Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2005). 
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time. We focus on morning start times between five and twelve o’clock (which applies to 97 
per cent of those with a fixed schedule). The choice of a 5–12 a.m. interval or a smaller one 
does not appear to be essential. We prefer the former to capture the whole relevant 
distribution of start times.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Frequency distribution of start time (SOEP 2004, 2006, 2008) 
 
Figure 1 shows the frequency distribution of morning start times. Although start time is, 
in principle, a continuous variable, most workers report to start work at a whole or half hour. 
Many workers report that they start at exactly 8:00 a.m. (23 per cent), 7:00 a.m. (20 per cent) 
and 7:30 a.m. (14 per cent); most workers start within a one hour interval: 63 per cent start 
between 6:59 and 8:01 a.m., which we call the peak interval. The proportion of workers that 
starts before the peak is roughly the same as after the peak (17 per cent respectively 18 per 
cent). The mean and median start times occur at 7:32 and 7:30 a.m. respectively, so in the 
middle of the peak interval. The maximal rounding error in the start time value is small and 
only five minutes, since start time is measured in ten-minute intervals. We therefore may 
assume that rounding does not affect the consistency of the estimates. 
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Figure 2. Wage levels (in log) by start hour (SOEP 2004, 2006, 2008) 
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Figure 3. Bi-annual change in log wages by change in start hour (SOEP 2004, 2006, 2008) 
 
In our analyses we focus on the workers’ (bi-annual) change in start times. Many 
workers do not change their start time (substantially), but 4.8 per cent change their morning 
start time by more than one hour. Hourly wage, our main dependent variable, is calculated by 
dividing net monthly earnings by monthly contractual hours of work. It ranges from €3 to 
€64, with a mean of €11.2. Figure 2 plots wage levels (in log) by start hour. It clearly shows 
Change in start hourStart hour
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that wage levels strongly decrease at non-peak times, but it can be easily seen that this 
relationship is largely spurious: Figure 3 plots workers’ (bi-annual) change in log wages by 
change in start hour, and shows that the change in wages is rather independent of changes in 
start hour. In Figure 2, wages and start hour seem correlated with each other possibly because 
they are both correlated with a third causal variable that is unobserved such as unobserved 
ability characteristics of the worker. 
  
2.2 Econometric model 
The approach we use to estimate the effect of start time on wages is standard in the 
hedonic wage literature (see, for example, Duncan and Holmlund, 1983). This wage equation 
is not an explicit supply or demand wage equation (Rosen, 1974), but rather the wage change 
associated with any given start time change is a market-determined compensating differential. 
The hedonic wage literature assumes a competitive labour market, so the variables (including 
start time) can be assumed to be exogenous in the estimation procedure, because employers 
set wages as a function of work start time.  
We estimate the logarithm of the wage, W, as a function of start time and control 
variables. For example, we control for the size of the firm, which captures variation in 
productivity. We further control for other variables, such as presence of a child, which may 
be correlated with omitted variables (for example, childcare start time) that are correlated 
with our main variable of interest, work start time. Start hour changes may include 
observations where the worker’s occupation also changes. So, by not controlling for 
occupation we allow that occupation is an endogenous choice. 
Because the hedonic wage literature generally allows wage rates to vary with hours of 
work (Kinoshita, 1987; Trejo, 1991; Hartog and Oosterbeek, 1993; Dustmann and van Soest, 
1998), we control for (contractual) weekly hours. Hourly wage rates are calculated by 
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dividing monthly earnings by monthly hours.6 Such a calculation introduces a well-known 
form of measurement error, known as ‘division bias’, because measurement error in hours 
enters both the left and right hand-sight of the equation that we will estimate. This results in a 
spurious negative correlation between hours and the wage rate (Hartog and Oosterbeek, 1993; 
Dustmann and van Soest, 1998), because overreporting of hours would lead to an 
underreporting of the hourly wage rate. So, we calculate the wage rate using contractual 
hours instead of usual hours, because the division bias in hourly wage rates using contractual 
hours is substantially less than using usual hours.   
We emphasize that we also include (the usual) daily hours of work (in line with Zhang 
et al., 2005), so start time captures the effect of start and end times (because end time equals 
start time plus daily hours). Because we control for daily hours and weekly hours, we also 
control for number of days worked per week (as the number of days worked is fully 
determined by the number of daily and weekly hours). Furthermore, by controlling for daily 
hours of work and weekly hours, we also control for work flexibility over the week, which 
may be relevant from a transportation perspective as the literature points out a relationship 
between type of workweek and commuting (see, for example, Hung, 1996). 
Using control variables may not be sufficient to generate consistent estimates of start 
time (Arnott, 2007). So, we include worker fixed effects, which controls for unobserved time-
invariant worker characteristics. In the estimation procedure, only within-worker’s 
differences in variables are employed.  
 
2.3 Empirical results 
We focus on the effect of the morning start time (measured in hours), which we observe for 
fixed schedules. We control for other work schedules by including dummies for flexible 
                                               
6
  This variable is the average hourly wage during one year. We set €3 as minimum hourly wage, though no 
general legal minimum wage exists in Germany (Immervoll, 2007). 
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schedules, evening work (starting after 12:00 a.m.) and night work (starting before 5:00 
a.m.). As emphasized in the introduction, it is plausible that the wage is a non-linear function 
of start time, so we employ a range of non-linear specifications (quadratic and piecewise 
linear functions; interval dummies). 
The results given a quadratic specification (see Table 1, column 1a) indicate that the 
relationship between wages and start time is inverse U-shaped: the effect of start time on 
wage is positive and the square of start time is negative, with a maximum around 7:41 a.m. 
(s.e. 1.29). The use of a quadratic specification may not be appropriate, because it allows for 
an (inverse) U-shaped function, but it does not allow for any other functional form. 
Therefore, we also estimate a model using six morning start time dummies: two before the 
peak (5:00–5:59 a.m. and 6:00–6:59 a.m.) and three after the peak (8:01–8:59 a.m., 9:00–9:59 
a.m. and 10:00–12:00 a.m.), where peak time (6:59–8:01 a.m.) is the reference category. The 
results (see column 2) suggest that wages are slightly lower before 7 a.m. and after 9 a.m., but 
these effects are statistically insignificant using a F-test, reported at the bottom of the table. 
One disadvantage of a time-interval dummy specification is that it ignores variation 
within intervals. This seems restrictive, as the difference in congestion or scheduling 
preferences within these intervals may be quite large. So, we also use a piecewise linear 
specification with four predefined knots at 5:00, 6:59, 8:01 a.m. and 12:00 a.m., so we 
estimate three different slopes (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991, pp. 126–7). The piecewise 
linear function we estimate is standard and has three different time intervals ruling the effect 
of start time on wage by specifying the model, in general notation, in the following way: 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2 2 3 35 5 5S D S D S Dβ β β− + − + −  ( )1 2 3 2 32 ,D D Dβ β+ + + where βi, i = 1, 2, 3, refers to 
the coefficient to be estimated in interval i, S is start time (in hours) between 5:00 and 12:00 
a.m., D1, D2 and D3 are before-peak, peak and after-peak start time dummies. As can be seen 
from the F-test at the bottom of Table 1, column 3, this specification also does not support 
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any relationship. We also examined other knots, but the results are the same. 
 
Table 1. Estimates of net hourly wage in log (in euros) (SOEP 2004, 2006, 2008)  
 
  [1a] [2] [3] [1b] 
 
  
Worker fixed effect 
    OLS 
 
  Quadratic 
function 
6 start time 
dummies 
Piecewise linear 
function 
= [1a] except 
no fixed effect 
Morning start time variables 
    
Start time (hours)   0.089 (0.035)**     0.225 (0.033)** 
Start time squared (hours) –0.006 (0.002)**   –0.013 (0.002)** 
Start time 5:00–5:59  –0.015 (0.020)   
Start time 6:00–6:59  –0.006 (0.008)   
Start time 8:01–8:59    0.001 (0.008)   
Start time 9:00–9:59  –0.022 (0.011)**   
Start time 10:00–12:00  –0.023 (0.027) 
  
Start time (hours)/10 (before peak)     0.002 (0.016)  
Start time (hours)/10 (peak interval)     0.008 (0.011)  
Start time (hours)/10 (after peak)   –0.014 (0.019)  
Start time control variables     
Flexible schedule –0.007 (0.006) –0.004 (0.006) –0.004 (0.006)   0.012 (0.006)** 
Night work –0.028 (0.038) –0.027 (0.038) –0.025 (0.038) –0.145 (0.034)** 
Evening work –0.049 (0.021)** –0.046 (0.021)** –0.045 (0.021)** –0.036 (0.019)* 
Other controls     
Daily working hours in log   0.158 (0.018)**   0.157 (0.018)**   0.158 (0.018)**   0.422 (0.017)** 
Weekly working hours in log –0.532 (0.018)** –0.533 (0.018)** –0.532 (0.018)** –0.252 (0.015)** 
Self-employed   0.025 (0.016)   0.025 (0.016)   0.025 (0.016)   0.170 (0.015)** 
White collar   0.030 (0.010)**   0.030 (0.010)**    0.030 (0.010)**   0.144 (0.006)** 
Civil servant   0.038 (0.019)**   0.038 (0.019)*   0.038 (0.019)*   0.347 (0.011)** 
Firm size < 20   0.013 (0.008)   0.012 (0.008)   0.012 (0.008) –0.165 (0.011)** 
Firm size from 20 ≤ 200   0.002 (0.007)   0.002 (0.007)   0.002 (0.007) –0.107 (0.010)** 
Firm size from 200 ≤ 2000   0.004 (0.007)   0.004 (0.007)   0.003 (0.007) –0.047 (0.010)** 
Firm size unknown   0.018 (0.012)   0.018 (0.012)   0.018 (0.012) –0.006 (0.018) 
Other household income in log –0.036 (0.003)** –0.036 (0.003)** –0.036 (0.003)** –0.037 (0.003)** 
Other household income unknown or 
zero 
  0.089 (0.007)**   0.089 (0.007)**   0.089 (0.007)**   0.104 (0.008)** 
Partner   0.056 (0.008)**   0.056 (0.008)**   0.056 (0.008)**   0.072 (0.006)** 
Child   0.060 (0.008)**   0.060 (0.008)**   0.061 (0.008)**   0.133 (0.007)** 
Female × child –0.061 (0.015)** –0.061 (0.015)** –0.062 (0.015)** –0.089 (0.011)** 
Primary and lower education    –0.286 (0.010)** 
(Upper) secondary education    –0.258 (0.006)** 
Post-secondary non tertiary 
education    –0.213 (0.010)
**
 
First stage of tertiary education    –0.189 (0.009)** 
Education unknown    –0.242 (0.022)** 
Age/10      0.081 (0.003)** 
Female    –0.177 (0.006)** 
Constant      1.526 (0.137)** 
Worker fixed effect Yes Yes Yes  
p-value (F-test start time) 0.011  0.117 0.838 0.000 
Adjusted R2 0.917 0.917 0.917 0.520 
No. observations 14,108 14,108 14,108 14,108 
No. workers 8,364 8,364 8,364 8,364 
  
Notes: Year, industrial sector and firm location controls included. Usual daily hours of work, contractual weekly hours 
of work, firm size is number of workers. ** and * indicate that estimates are significantly different from zero at 0.05 and 
0.10 level. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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These results do not support the conclusion of Wilson (1988), who reports that the 
relationship between wages and start time is strongly inverse U-shaped, as our results indicate 
that there is maybe a weak inverse U-shaped relationship. This may not even be true, as in the 
flexible specifications, we are not able to find any statistically significant effect. The results 
of an analysis without fixed effects can be compared to the results of Wilson (1988), who 
does not use these effects. The results without fixed effects (see Table 1, column 1b) imply 
that the relationship between wages and start time is strongly inverse U-shaped (with a 
maximum at 8:40 a.m.), in line with Wilson (1988) (and Figure 2). As emphasized above, it is 
plausible that relevant unobserved variables are correlated with start time, and these estimates 
are therefore spurious. 
We also estimated separate models distinguishing between workers with and without 
young children (aged below 14 years), because the inconvenience of work schedules may be 
different for these different groups (see Table 2). For example, workers with young children 
may have a higher level of family responsibility to meet child-care schedules in the morning 
or family gatherings in the evening (another motivation could be that the presence of children 
is the main determinant of start times, as shown in separate analysis not reported here). In our 
data, 31 per cent of workers have a young child.7  
Given a quadratic specification of start time (columns 1 and 4), the results suggest that 
the relationship between wages and start time is U-shaped for workers with children (with a 
minimum at 7:19 a.m.; s.e. 6.36), and inverse U-shaped for workers without children (with a 
maximum at 7:35 a.m.; s.e. 6.05). The results suggest therefore that workers with a child have 
to be compensated by higher wages if they start work at an off-peak time. However, the 
estimated minimum and maximum start times are not well-identified due to the large standard 
errors. Therefore, one may raise doubt on the validity of this interpretation.  
                                               
7
 It is not possible to identify effects based on models of workers with children with and without a partner due to 
too small sample sizes. 
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Table 2. Estimates of net hourly wage in log (in euros) by workers with and without children (SOEP 2004, 2006, 2008) 
 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
   Child No child 
   Quadratic function 6 start time dummies Piecewise linear function Quadratic function 6 start time dummies 
Piecewise linear 
function 
Morning start time variables       
Start time (hours) –0.124 (0.067)*     0.103 (0.041)**   
Start time squared (hours)   0.009 (0.004)**   –0.007 (0.003)**   
Start time 5:00–5:59 
 
  0.068 (0.046)   –0.021 (0.021)  
Start time 6:00–6:59 
 
  0.008 (0.014)   –0.003 (0.009)  
Start time 8:01–8:59 
 
–0.007 (0.015)     0.012 (0.010)*  
Start time 9:00–9:59 
 
  0.023 (0.021)   –0.041 (0.013)**  
Start time 10:00–12:00 
 
  0.095 (0.048)**   –0.046 (0.032)  
Start time (hours)/10 (before peak)     0.011 (0.030) 
 
   0.010 (0.020) 
Start time (hours)/10 (peak interval)   –0.011 (0.021) 
 
    0.001 (0.013) 
Start time (hours)/10 (after peak)     0.046 (0.034) 
 
 –0.012 (0.022) 
Start time control variables       
Flexible schedule   0.021 (0.011)*   0.019 (0.011)*   0.016 (0.011) –0.010 (0.007) –0.008 (0.007) –0.005 (0.007) 
Night work   0.026 (0.070)   0.024 (0.070)   0.022 (0.070) –0.050 (0.045) –0.051 (0.045) –0.046 (0.045) 
Evening work   0.065 (0.034)*   0.063 (0.034)*   0.029 (0.034)* –0.112 (0.030)** –0.118 (0.030)** –0.115 (0.030)** 
Other controls       
Daily working hours in log   0.180 (0.033)**   0.180 (0.033)**   0.178 (0.033)**   0.175 (0.022)**   0.176 (0.022)**   0.177 (0.022)** 
Weekly working hours in log –0.599 (0.035)** –0.598 (0.035)** –0.596 (0.035)** –0.605 (0.024)** –0.604 (0.024)** –0.602 (0.024)** 
Self-employed –0.016 (0.027) –0.016 (0.027) –0.017 (0.027)   0.069 (0.020)**   0.069 (0.020)**   0.069 (0.020)** 
White collar   0.012 (0.018)   0.013 (0.018)   0.012 (0.018)   0.032 (0.012)**   0.032 (0.012)**   0.033 (0.012)** 
Civil servant   0.015 (0.036)   0.015 (0.036)   0.014 (0.036)   0.062 (0.024)**   0.061 (0.024)**   0.062 (0.024)** 
Firm size < 20   0.020 (0.016)   0.021 (0.016)   0.020 (0.016)   0.016 (0.010)   0.016 (0.010)   0.015 (0.010) 
Firm size from 20 ≤ 200 –0.005 (0.013) –0.005 (0.013) –0.005 (0.013)   0.018 (0.008)**   0.019 (0.008)**   0.019 (0.008)** 
Firm size from 200 ≤ 2000 –0.006 (0.013) –0.006 (0.013) –0.005 (0.013)   0.016 (0.008)*   0.016 (0.008)*   0.016 (0.008)* 
Firm size unknown –0.001 (0.023) –0.000 (0.023)   0.000 (0.023)   0.027 (0.014)*   0.027 (0.014)**   0.027 (0.014)** 
Other household income in log –0.046 (0.005)** –0.046 (0.005)** –0.046 (0.005)** –0.027 (0.003)** –0.027 (0.003)** –0.026 (0.003)** 
Other household income unknown or 
zero 
  0.111 (0.013)**   0.110 (0.013)**   0.111 (0.013)**   0.077 (0.008)**   0.077 (0.008)**   0.077 (0.008)** 
Partner  –0.007 (0.025) –0.009 (0.025) –0.007 (0.025)   0.062 (0.009)**   0.061 (0.009)**   0.061 (0.009)** 
Worker fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
p-value (F-test start time) 0.065 0.021 0.198 0.012 0.040 0.952 
Adjusted R2 0.925 0.966 0.925 0.921 0.921 0.921 
No. observations 4,410 4,410 4,410 9,698 9,698 9,698 
No. workers 2,831 2,831 2,831 6,016 6,016 6,016 
  
Notes: Year, industrial sector and firm location controls included. Usual daily hours of work, contractual weekly hours of work, firm size is number of workers. ** and * indicate that 
estimates are significantly different from zero at 0.05 and 0.10 level. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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A specification using six dummies (columns 2 and 5) also suggest a different 
relationship by worker: a U-shaped for workers with children and inverse U-shaped for 
workers without children. A U-shape relationship implies that, at least for some jobs, workers 
are more productive when they start outside the peak (as it is implausible that employers 
compensate for an inconvenient work schedule unless the worker is more productive); in 
addition, the benefits of starting at a non-peak time are relatively lower (for example, because 
higher inconvenience in scheduling times) and workers therefore demand higher wages. 
However, these results are only suggestive as they are not statistically significant. 
Furthermore, given a piecewise linear function (columns 3 and 6) – which is our preferred 
specification due to above-mentioned arguments – effects are also statistically insignificant. 
So, overall, our findings suggest that the relationship between wages and start times do not 
strongly differ by workers with and without children.  
As sensitivity analyses, we re-estimated all models using a more narrow definition of 
morning start time (between six and ten o’clock) and added controls (commuting distance, 
job tenure and interactions of start time with self-employed), but the results remain the same. 
In our main analyses, we do not control for commuting distance because commuting distance 
does not affect the workers’ productivity and therefore wages in a competitive labour market. 
However, according to the job search theory literature, distance is positively correlated to 
wages (see Manning, 2003). Excluding weekly hours, the signs of the effect of start time on 
wage are the same for all specifications, but the sizes of these effects are somewhat smaller 
than the ones discussed above, so all effects are statistically insignificant. We find a negative 
effect of weekly hours of work. A negative effect is also found in other German studies 
(Dustmann and van Soest, 1998). Excluding any other variable than weekly hours (including 
daily hours) generates almost identical results. 
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The welfare effects of a program that requires firms to stagger work hours (for 
example, the government may regulate the distribution of firms’ start times) are theoretically 
unclear. The benefits of these programs (a reduction in external congestion costs) are 
relatively easy to determine; for example, the external savings in commuting time by starting 
at 9 a.m. instead of 8 a.m. (peak time) are estimated to be €2.45 per day.8 However, there is 
little or no information on the costs in terms of productivity losses (or gains) and workers’ 
disutility, so that the net effect is unknown.  
Our results imply a weak (or no) relationship between wages and start time, which 
indicates that start time of workers has relatively little effect on wages (and therefore 
productivity and workers’ disutility) suggesting that staggered-hours programs that induce 
workers to start work at non-peak times are welfare-enhancing due to the reduction in 
external costs. This is in contrast to Arnott et al. (2005) who, on theoretical grounds, 
conclude that it is better that governments do not interfere with the work schedules of firms. 
Now suppose that governments impose a staggering-work-hours program for some 
industries or type of firms (for example, large firms) and also impose that wages remain fixed 
(which may be feasible in the short-run). For example, staggering can be done by regulating 
the distribution of work start times of firms with at least 1,000 employees. Alternatively, 
governments may stagger the work start times of civil servants.9 If one believes the difference 
suggested by our results by type of worker, such programs enhance the surplus of workers 
without children, but decrease the surplus of workers with children, but induce opposite 
effects on the firms’ surpluses.10  
  
                                               
8
 The latter estimate has been based using an external congestion cost of 0.068€ per km (see Small and Verhoef, 
2007, p. 99) and a mean one-way commuting distance of 18 km. This estimate is likely a maximum as it is 
based on the assumption that a commute for job starting at 9 a.m. does not induce any congestion. 
9
 This is a second-best policy so that it is not clear a priori what happens at the peak period to trips that are made 
for other purposes than commuting. 
10
 This suggests that these programs may enlarge the negative effect of having children on female’s labour 
supply (Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau and van Ommeren, 2010). 
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3.0 Conclusion 
Transport economists have been interested in workers’ work start time for many years, as 
start (and therefore end) times are closely related to morning (afternoon) peak congestion. 
Staggered-hours programs to mitigate congestion also affect worker’s preferences and 
productivity, and are then an interesting policy tool. Little is known about the effect of these 
programs on productivity and workers’ preferences (Arnott, 2007). One (indirect) way to get 
more information about this is to estimate the effect of start time on wages. In this paper, we 
examined the effect of workers’ morning start (and end) time on wages for Germany. 
Arnott (2007) emphasized that it is important in hedonic wage studies to control for 
worker sorting based on unobserved variables. We take this issue into account by estimating 
worker fixed-effects models. Wages are a slight inverse U-function of start time, although 
some specification may imply that wages are constant when work starts before peak time (7–
8 a.m.) and only slightly lower after peak time. However, wages are more likely U-shaped for 
workers with a child when work starts after peak time.  
It has been emphasized that staggering of work hours by governments in order to 
mitigate congestion must be well designed in order not to reduce social welfare (Arnott, 
2005). The benefits of staggering work hours are clear (a reduction in external congestion 
costs), but there is little or no information on the costs in terms of productivity losses and 
workers’ disutility. Although our data does not allow us to distinguish between productivity 
and workers’ disutility effects of start times on wages (since data on worker productivity is 
required), we still can speculate. Our results imply that the start time of workers has relatively 
little effect on wages (and therefore productivity and workers’ disutility) suggesting that 
staggered-hours programs that induce workers to start work at non-peak hours, maybe even 
when introduced on a large scale, may be beneficial. So, in this respect, we are slightly more 
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optimistic than Arnott et al. (2005) who recommend that governments should not use these 
programs. 
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